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Negotiator Behavior Under Arbitration
ABSTRACT
The emerging empirical literature on the economics of arbitration has
focused primarily on the behavior of arbitrators under alternative forms
of arbitration. This article suggests that it is natural for empirical
economists to now expand their focus to include issues related to the
behavior of negotiators. In this connection, three key aspects of
negotiator behavior are discussed: (1) the decision to settle a dispute
voluntarily or to proceed to arbitration; (2) the strategy for selecting
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Bilateral bargaining lies at the heart of many important economic
institutions. Even when there are substantial gains to trade, disputes are a
natural and persistent element of bargaining situations. In order to
economize on the cost of disputes, a number of mechanisms for preventing or
resolving disputes have evolved. The public court system is perhaps the
best-known of these mechanisms, although private adjudication systems also
exist. Moreover, because of increasing costs and congestion in the public
court system, private mechanisms for adjudicating disputes have, in recent
years, abounded in both number and scope.
One of the most popular private mechanisms for adjudicating disputes is
arbitration. For example, in the area of labor-management relations, there
were over 100,000 arbitration cases in the U.S. in 1985 --aboutfour times
the number that took place just fifteen years earlier. Indeed, over the past
two decades, nearly half the states in the U.S. have established interest
arbitration mechanisms to resolve pay disputes involving groups of public
employees. Arbitration is also widely used to resolve commercial disputes
and, more recently, to resolve selected categories of civil disputes that
might otherwise congest the public court system.
Although arbitration mechanisms can vary substantially in design, they
all tend to involve a third-party to a dispute determining its resolution.
Arbitration guarantees finality in the resolution of a dispute, generally in a
timely and legitimate fashion that limits the erosion of a bargaining
relationship that might result from the existence of a dispute.
1Arbitration is a fascinating mechanism for economists to study. First,
the possibilities for empirical analysis are often quite extraordinary. For
example, in comparison to the public court system, there is more heterogeneity
in the types of "arbitration experiments" available and less heterogeneity in
the data (i.e., similar disputes are dealt with according to a wide variety of
arbitration mechanisms). Moreover, the outcomes of wage and salary
arbitration are relatively easy to quantify for purposes of empirical analysis
and permit econometric models to build on much existing research on wage
determination. Thus, the study of arbitration --arelatively simple
mechanism for resolving disputes -- mayyield important insights into more
complex legal mechanisms that are relatively difficult to model and to subject
to empirical analysis.
Second, arbitration systems provide excellent settings for testing some
of the most basic propositions of game theory. Arbitration is essentially a
game with simple and well-specified rules in which a small number of players
can be easily identified. The availability of "real-world" data on situations
in which there are incentives to behave strategically provides remarkable
opportunities for the analysis of game-theoretic behavior.
Third, insofar as arbitration mechanisms can be structured in different
ways, studying arbitration might lead to improved designs. Indeed, theoretical
work on arbitration has raised a number of policy-relevant issues whose
resolution ultimately depends upon the results of empirical analysis.
The emerging empirical literature on the economics of arbitration has
been primarily concerned with modeling the behavior of arbitrators under
2alternative forms of arbitration. It seems natural that the empirical
literature turn next to consideration of the behavior of negotiators under
arbitration (which typically depends critically on expectations about
arbitrator behavior). Our chief purpose in the remainder of this article is
to identify some of the issues that might sensibly be raised by empirical
economists studying arbitration from the point of view of the negotiating
parties.
In a typical bargaining/arbitration situation, there are three key
problems that negotiators must solve. First, they must decide whether to
settle their dispute voluntarily or to proceed to arbitration. Second, they
must adopt a strategy for selecting an arbitrator. Third, they must bargain
prior to arbitration and, if they are unable to settle voluntarily, they must
formulate final positions to advance in arbitration. The remainder of this
article will discuss each of these three choice variables in turn.1
I. Negotiation vs. Arbitration
The American system of industrial relations exhibits a strong normative
preference for resolving disputes without the aid of third parties. Thus,
Stevens' (1966) observation that arbitration mechanisms can be designed in
ways that discourage their use was greeted enthusiastically by the proponents
of arbitration. Briefly, Stevens likened arbitration to the strike as a
mechanism for imposing costs of disagreement on bargainers and thereby
promoting voluntary settlements. These costs are composed of the direct costs
of using an arbitration mechanism and the indirect costs that are generated by
3the interplay of arbitral uncertainty and disputants' risk aversion.
Subsequent work by Farber and Katz (1979) formalized Stevens' notion by
deriving expressions for a contract zone, i.e., a locus of potential
settlement points, all of which are preferred by both parties to the
settlement expected under arbitration. A contract zone may be generated
either by the costs of arbitration or by at least one bargainer having overly
pessimistic expectations about an arbitrator's award. Conversely, a contract
zone will tend to be small or nonexistent when at least one bargainer has
overly optimistic expectations about an arbitrator's award.
These early analyses assumed that voluntary settlements would be reached
whenever there was a contract zone. Thus, divergent and mutually inconsistent
expectations seemed to be a key determinant of the resort to arbitration.
More recent work has pointed out that the existence of a contract zone is
necessary, but not sufficient, for arbitration to lead to a voluntary
settlement because there may be substantial direct costs of negotiation as
well as uncertainty about settlement points within the contract zone; it
follows that wider contract zones do not, ceteris paribus, imply lower impasse
probabilities (Bloom, 1981).
One of the most striking facts about arbitration requiring explanation is
the substantial fraction of bargaining cases that end up being arbitrated:
the steady-state rate of arbitration usage seems to vary between 15 and 30
percent in states with compulsory interest arbitration laws. In view of this
fact, the theory that divergent expectations about arbitrator behavior explain
the use of arbitration is less than satisfactory. It seems unlikely that
4bargainers would consistently be overly optimistic about the size of an
arbitration award in the context of what is essentially a repeated game. Even
in the context of one-shot bargaining, rational bargainers will tend to
reconcile their prior expectations about an arbitrator's behavior in the
negotiations leading up to arbitration (e.g., see Geanakopolos and
Polemarchakis, 1982). Thus, alternative explanations are worth exploring.
Arbitration usage rates are not notably different in states with
conventional arbitration provisions and those with final-offer arbitration
provisions.2 This fact tends to contradict two early, but still
influential, views about arbitration:(1) the view that final-offer
arbitration would induce risk-averse bargainers to make concessions until
their bargaining positions eventually overlapped, thereby eliminating the need
for arbitration, and (2) the view that split-the-difference behavior on the
part of conventional arbitrators (whether actual or perceived) would tend to
"chill" negotiators from making concessions in the bargaining that precedes
arbitration and thereby increase the probability of a dispute ending up in
arbitration.
Another early theory held that arbitration would have a "narcotic effect"
on bargainers, according to which bargainers would habitually avoid the
arduous demands of bargaining in favor of arbitrated outcomes. Simple
descriptive statistics do seem to indicate that there is substantial variation
in arbitration usage across bargaining units. Whether this tendency is indeed
evidence of a genuine narcotic effect is difficult to test because it requires
establishing serial correlation in the use of arbitration -- aftercontrolling
for heterogeneity across bargaining units.
5Future analyses of the resort to arbitration might usefully build upon
the notion that bargaining parties are not internally homogeneous entities
with identical preferences. Bargainers often have constituencies whose future
political support they desire. Insofar as arbitrators can be viewed as paid
"scapegoats," the parties' final positions and their resort to arbitration
might be modeled in a principal-agent framework. In this spirit, Crawford
(1982b) develops a formal game-theoretic model of bargaining impasses based on
the notion that parties may rationally commit to irreconciliable bargaining
positions. The political pressure of the constituency makes concession after
commitment costly and so can lead to impasse.
To date, there have been few attempts to empirically implement a
structural model of the arbitrate/negotiate decision. Although some studies
have been conducted using experimental data, further analysis,especially
using available data from actual arbitration systems, is much needed.
II. The Selection of Arbitrators
One of the most salient differences between arbitration and the public
court system is that disputants typically have some say in the appointment of
arbitrators. The two leading arbitrator selection mechanismsoperate by
having an impartial agency (such as the American Arbitration Association)
supply disputants with identical lists of an odd number of arbitrators (along
with information on their backgrounds, fees, etc.). Alternate strike
mechanisms work by having each party alternately cross a name off the list
with the last name remaining becoming the appointed arbitrator. Rank-veto
6mechanisms work by having the parties each veto a prespecified number of
arbitrators, rank the remaining ones in order of their preference, and then
refer the list back to the agency which then makes anappointment in
accordance with those preferences. The opportunity for disputants toexpress
their preferences for different arbitratorssuggests an element of strategic
interaction according to which negotiatorsmay veto or give relatively
unpreferred rankings to highly preferred arbitrators in an attempt to
manipulate the selection process.
The analysis of arbitrator selection is interesting for severalreasons.
First, it yields direct information on the characteristics of arbitrators that
negotiators find desirable. Second, measuring the similarity of union and
employer preferences for individual arbitrators may yield insights into
whether collective bargaining and arbitration areprimarily institutions of
conflict or cooperation. Third, it can provide informationon the strategic
sophistication of negotiators and on the importance of strategic interaction
in bargaining. Finally, as we argue below, theprocess of arbitrator
selection may be closely related to the use of arbitration.
The empirical literature on the selection of arbitrators is still inits
infancy and much important work remains to be done. In a recentpaper
(l986b), we analyzed a set of data on actual union and employerrankings of
different panels of arbitrators under a rank/veto mechanism. The results
indicate that unions and employers have similar preferences: in favor of
lawyers, more experienced arbitrators, and arbitrators who seem to have
favored their side in the past. In addition, both sides exhibitstrong
preferences about having economists serve as arbitrators, with employersbeing
7in favor and unions being against. The analysis also tests whether the
observed rankings data reveal the negotiators' true preferences over
arbitrators. The results provide no support for the hypothesis of strategic
misrepresentation of preferences by either side. Nonetheless, further
empirical analysis of arbitrator selection is desirable, especially in the
context of alternate strike mechanisms in which empirically falsifiable
hypotheses about strategic behavior can be tested directly.
In another paper (1986a), we researched two aspects of the arbitrator
selection phase of an arbitration system: (1) the strategies and outcomes of
the selection "sub-game" and (2) the impact of selection mechanisms on the
bargaining environment. Our results on the selection sub-game indicate that
there is frequently no incentive to strategically misrepresent preferences --
dependingon the bargainers' preferences over arbitrators and on how much
information they have about the other side's preferences. Thus, our earlier
empirical results do not necessarily imply that negotiators are
unsophisticated or irrational in their behavior. On the other hand,
individually rational behavior in situations in which negotiators do have
incentives to strategically misrepresent their preferences can result in
inefficient selections.
This work also led us to conclude that arbitration is not necessarily
best viewed in a purely static framework in which the size of the contract
zone is fixed by an unchanging amount of arbitral uncertainty. We developed a
model of the bargaining/arbitration process that has three distinct stages:
(1) bargaining that takes place before the panel of prospective arbitrators is
announced; (2) bargaining that takes place after the panel of prospective
8arbitrators is announced but before a particular arbitrator is selected; and
(3) bargaining that takes place after a particular arbitrator is selected.
Corresponding to each separate stage is a specific degree of uncertainty about
the final resolution of the dispute.Furthermore, the degree of uncertainty
tends to decrease as the parties move from one stage to the next.
Although empirical analysis of the relationship between arbitrator selection
mechanisms and the probability of impasse have yet to be conducted, we suspect
that a dynamic mechanism that confronts bargainers with a varied set of
bargaining environments is likely to provide them with better opportunities to
reach agreement than a static mechanism that presents them with a single
alternative. In practice, there is a substantial amount of voluntary
settlement in each of the distinct stages of the bargaining/arbitration
process.
III. Determination of Negotiators' Arbitration Positions
The earliest models of negotiators' arbitration positions presuppose that
arbitrator preferences are imperfectly known to the disputants and depend
solely on the exogenous facts of a dispute. In such a model, the mean of the
distribution of arbitrator preferences becomes the focal point around which
negotiators bargain, both in the negotiations that precede arbitration as well
as in the arbitration process itself. If that focal point is different from
the average settlement that would be negotiated in the absence of arbitration,
the "option to arbitrate" will bias negotiated settlements. In addition, the
negotiated settlements may not be Pareto efficient if there are multiple
issues in dispute (see Crawford, 1979, 1982a).
9Final-offer arbitration provides negotiators with an incentive to
moderate their positions since less extreme positions presumably have higher
probabilities of being selected by an arbitrator. However, because smaller
payoffs are associated with more moderate positions, negotiators also have
some incentive to adopt extreme positions. In the context of single-issue
disputes, Nash final offers have the following properties: (1) the final offer
of the more risk-averse negotiator will lie closer to the mean of the prior
distribution of arbitrator preferences than the final offer of the less
risk-averse negotiator; (2) increasing arbitral uncertainty by lowering the
density of arbitrator preferences at the mean of the Nash pair of final offers
causes those offers to diverge; and (3) even if both negotiators are risk
neutral, arbitral uncertainty will cause their final offers to diverge
(symmetrically) from the median of the arbitrator's preference distribution
(see Farber l98l).
Under conventional arbitration, negotiators have literally no incentive
to express a final position if arbitrator preferences are conditioned solely
on exogenous background information. The fact that they almost always do
suggests that the true model of arbitrator preferences may be somewhat
different. An alternative (but equally polar) model of the behavior of
conventional arbitrators is one in which they simply "split-the-difference"
between the parties' final positions. The fact that conventional arbitration
decisions typically lie near the average of the parties' final positions
provides at least some empirical support for this view, although proper
evaluation of this piece of data requires a model of negotiator behavior.
It seems obvious that the negotiators optimal final offers will diverge
10if arbitrators mechanically "split-the-difference." An intermediate model, in
which an arbitrator's preferred settlement depends on both the exogenous facts
and the parties' final positions, would seem to be more plausible. This
formulation suggests that arbitrators extract a useful signal about negotiator
preferences from their final positions. If so, it follows that negotiators
will have an incentive to communicate strategically to the arbitrator through
their final offers.
The notion that negotiator final offers are attempts to "position the
arbitrator," suggests that arbitrator and negotiator behavior should be
modeled as a three-party game. It also suggests that econometric attempts to
estimate the parameters of arbitrator preference functions by studying how
arbitrator's behave when confronted with different sets of facts and final
positions may be misspecified insofar as the final positions are endogenously
determined. Put another way, it remains an open empirical question whether
arbitrators should mainly be viewed as individuals who (1) impose on the
negotiators their exogenous preferences or (2) seek to learn about the
disputants' preferences from the relationship between the facts and final
positions in an attempt to search for outcomes that maximize the disputants'
welfare. Gibbons (1986) has begun the important task of modeling arbitrator
behavior in the context of a three-party game of arbitration, although further
work remains to be done.
In this connection, it is worth reflecting on the relation between the
bargaining process that precedes arbitration and the arbitration game itself.
Indeed, it is only reasonable to suppose that split-the-difference behavior on
the part of arbitrators will "chill" negotiators from making concessions in
11the bargaining that precedes arbitration if one imagines that (1) negotiating
concessions cannot be "taken back" in arbitration and (2) arbitrators extract
information from the parties' pre-arbitration behavior. In practice, both
conditions are likely to be satisfied, suggesting a close coupling of behavior
in negotiations and arbitration. Perhaps a small change in the design of
arbitration mechanisms, in which arbitration hearings would be conducted
without reference to the negotiations that preceded arbitration (i.e., de
novo), would uncouple the two games and better serve the interests
of both the negotiators and public policy.
Simple facts about the relation between negotiators' final positions
under conventional and final-offer arbitration could be a good starting point
for further theoretical work. Table I reports the average of employer and
union final offers (EFO and TJFO) in the two types of salary arbitration cases
that took place in New Jersey in the years 1981-1984. As the table makes
clear, the parties' positions in conventional arbitration (CONV) tend to lie
outside the bounds of their positions in final-offer arbitration (FOA). This
pattern is consistent with the predictions of the very simplest arbitration
models according to which final-offer arbitration induces concessionary
behavior by risk-averse bargainers while conventional arbitration chills the
negotiation process that precedes arbitration. It remains to be seen whether
more complete models of negotiator behavior under arbitration can further
enrich our interpretation of these facts.
12Table I
Union and Employer Final Salary Offers
(expressed as percent increases)
1981 1982 1983 1984
CONV
EFO 6.4 5.1 6.3 6.2
UFO 9.6 9.2 9.0 8.3
FOA
EFO7.2 7.2 6.5 6.6
UFO9.0 9.3 8.3 7.8
Source:Authors'calculations based on New Jersey
arbitration awards.
13Notes
1Provided arbitration is not compelled by law, the parties must jointly
(and privately) decide whether they will use arbitration to resolve their
disputes. The decision to arbitrate can be made either before or at the time
a particular dispute arises. Although ex ante agreements to arbitrate
disputes raise interesting economic issues, they are beyond the scope of this
article.
2Under conventional arbitration, the arbitrator simply renders a decision
that consists of his or her best judgement of a fair settlement. In
contrast, the arbitrator is constrained to render a decision that consists of
one or the other of the parties' final offers, without compromise, under
final-offer arbitration.
Although the negotiators' final offers are interdependent in this simple
model, they may be independent of each other in a system of tn-offer
arbitration such as the one that operates in Iowa. Ashenfelter, Dow, and
Gallagher (1986) have done an interesting empirical analysis of the Iowa
system that attempts to test a simple model of optimal negotiator behavior.
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